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A study of the American decisions relating to the statute of frauds
from the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws reveals the fact that there
exists the greatest divergence of opinion with respect to contracts
falling within the fourth and seventeenth sections of the original English
statute of frauds. It is the purpose of this article to consider the prob-
lems that have been raised in connection with these cases, and to suggest
a solution. Of the contracts falling within the fourth section of the
statute of frauds those presented to the courts involving the Conflict of
Laws have been generally contracts not to be performed within a year,
contracts of guaranty, and contracts relating to land.
ENGLISH LAw-The leading case on the subject, Leroux v. Brown,1
laid down the English law with respect to cases falling within the fourth
section of the statute of frauds. An oral agreement had been entered
into at Calais, France, between the plaintiff and the defendant under
which the latter, who resided in England, contracted to employ the
former, who was a British subject resident at Calais, at a salary of oo
pounds per annum, to collect poultry and eggs in that neighborhood for
transmission to the defendant in England, the employment to com-
mence at a future day, and to continue for one year. In a suit for
breach of contract evidence was given on the part of the plaintiff to
show that by the law of France such an agreement was capable of being
enforced, although not in writing. For the defendant it was insisted
that notwithstanding the contract was made in France, when it was
sought to enforce it in England, it must be dealt with according to
(1852) 12 C. B. 8oi.
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English law, and, being a contract not to be performed within a year,
section 4 of the statute of frauds required it to be in writing. The
judges of the Common Pleas Court unanimously held that the def end-
ant's contention was sound and that a nonsuit should be entered. This
conclusion was based upon the particular wording of the fourth section
("no action shall be brought") and the decisions of the courts which
had held that a writing subsequent to the agreement and addressed to
a third person was a sufficient memorandum of the agreement, showing
that the above section involved "procedure" and not "the right and
validity of the contract itself." The cases of Carrington v. Roots
2 and
Reade v. Lamb,8 which had considered all contracts falling either within
the fourth or the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds as void,
were overruled. In his opinion Jervis, C. J., said:'
"I am of opinion that the 4 th section applies not to the solemnities of
the contract, but to the procedure; and therefore that the contract in
question cannot be sued upon here. The contract may be capable of
being enforced in the country where it was made: but not in England.
Looking at the words of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and
contrasting them with those of the xst, 3d, and 17th sections, this con-
clusion seems to me to be inevitable. The words of section 4 are, 'no
action shall be brought upon any agreement which is not to be per-
formed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless
the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some mem-
orandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party
to be charged therewith, or some other person thereto by him lawfully
authorized.' The statute, in this part of it, does not say, that, unless
those requisites are complied with, the contract shall be void, but
merely that no action shall be brought upon it and, as was put
with great force by Mr. Honyman, the alternative, 'unless the
agreement, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writ-
ing,'-words which are satisfied if there be any written evidence of
a previous agreement,--shows that the statute contemplated that the
agreement may be good, though not capable of being enforced if not
evidenced in writing. This therefore may be a very good agreement,
though, for want of a compliance with the requisites of the statute, not
enforceable in an English court of justice."
Referring to the difference in the wording between the fourth and
the seventeenth sections, Maule, J., said :5
"But we have been pressed with cases which it is said have decided
that the words 'no action shall be brought' in the 4 th section, are
equivalent to the words 'no contract shall be allowed to be good,' which
are found in another part of the statute .... It may be, that, for some
purposes, the words used in the 4th and 17th sections may be equivalent;
but they are clearly not so in the case now before us; for, there is
2 (1837, Exch.) 2 M. & W. 248.
(1851) 6 Exch. 13o.
(1852) 12 C. B. 8oi, 824.
Ibid. 826-827.
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nothing to prevent this contract from being enforced in a French court
of law. Dealing with the words of the 4th section as we are bound to
deal with all words that are plain and unambiguous, all we say, is, that
they prohibit the Courts of this country from enforcing a contract made
under circumstances like the present,--just as we hold a contract incapa-
ble of being enforced, where it appears upon the record to have been
made more than six years. It is parcel of the procedure, and not of the
formality of the contract."
Accordingly, because of its special phraseology, the 4th section was
deemed not to enter at all into the validity of the contract, not even into
its form, but to render it merely unenforceable.
Story's view that "all the formalities, proofs, or authentications of
them which are required by the lex loci, are indispensable to their valid-
ity everywhere else" was called to the attention of the court, but was
not accepted.
The suggested distinction between the fourth and seventeenth sections,
because of the difference in their wording, was never fully adopted
by the English courts. The prevailing view has been that such differ-
ence was unintentional, both sections relating only to the enforceability
of the contract.7 In accordance with this view the English Sale of
Goods Act has changed the former wording of the seventeenth section
to bring it into conformity with the fourth section.8 It now provides
that a sale of goods not complying with the terms of the statute "shall
not be enforceable by action."
The English law on the subject is therefore one of extreme simplicity.
So far as a contract falls within the fourth or the seventeenth section
of the English statute of frauds, it is unenforceable in England, if the
requisites of the English statute have not been met, irrespective of the
requirements of the law of the place of contracting, of the law of the
'Story, Conflict of Laws (ist ed. 1834) sec. 262. After the decision in Leroux
v. Brown a note was added in which the result of the English case was accepted.
Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1883) sec. 576, note a.
"Bailey v. Sweeting (1861) 9 C. B. (zr. s.) 843; Sievewright v. Archibald
(1851) 17 Q. B. 1O3; Brett, L. J., in Britain v. Rossiter (1879, C. A.) L. P. ii
Q. B. Div. 123; Lord Blackburn, in Maddison v. Alderson (1883, H. L.) L. R.
8 A. C. 467; Viscount Haldane, in Morris v. Baron [1918, H. L.] A. C. 1, 15.
See, however, Lord Finlay to the contrary. Ibid. ii. The same construction
has been placed upon the seventh section of the statute of frauds. Rochefoucauld
v. Boustead [1897, C. A.] i Ch. 196.
Dissenting voices have not been lacking, however. "I am not satisfied that
either of the sections of the statute of frauds to which reference has been made
warrants the decision [of Leroux v. Broznz]." Willes, J., in Williams v. Wheeler
(186o) 8 C. B. (x. s.) 299.
8 "Sec. 4 of the Sales of Goods Act," says Viscount Haldane, "relates to evi-
dence and procedure, and not to substantive validity." Morris v. Baron, supra
note 7, at p. 15. Lord Finlay was of the opinion that the distinction referred to
in the text had become established in English law and concluded therefore that
the Sale of Goods Act altered the law. Ibid. ii.
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place of performance, or, if the contract relates to land, of the situs of
the property.
AmIRICAN LAw-Contrary to the English law, the law of the United
States is in an unsettled condition. This situation results in the first
place from the variations in the wording of the two sections of the
statute of frauds under consideration. While the wording of the
fourth section of the original English statute has been followed by the
majority of states, there are many in which it has been modified.
Instead of providing that "no action shall be brought" it is frequently
said that the contract shall be "invalid"9 or "void."' 01  Sometimes the
statute reads that the contract shall not be "binding."' By providing
that "no evidence . . . . is competent, unless it be in writing," the Iowa
statute 2 makes it clear that the statute of frauds is intended to lay down
a mere rule of evidence.
The wording of the seventeenth section of the original English statute
of frauds providing that such contracts "shall not be allowed to
be good" was retained in a number of states.13 In many states such a
contract was declared to be "invalid"' 4 or "void,"'15 or not "binding."'"
9 Calif. Civ. Code, 1915, sec. 1624; Idaho, Comp. Sts. 1919, sec. 7976; Mont.
Rev. Code, 1921, sec. 7519; N. D. Comp. Laws, 1913, sec. 5888; Okla. Comp.
Laws, i909, sec. 1O89; S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 855-856. The section of the
Idaho statute adds the following: "Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot
be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents."
"'Ala. Code, 1907, sec. 4289; Colo. Rev. Sts. igo8, secs. 2662, 2666; Mich.
Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 11981; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 7003 (contracts relating
to land); Neb. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 2458; Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. 1075;
N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1909, ch. 41, sec. 31; N. C. Cons. Sts. 1919, sec. 988 (contracts
relating to land); Or. Rev. Laws, 192o sec. 8o8; Utah, Comp. Laws, 1917, sec.
5817; Wash. Codes & Sts. 191o, sec. 5289; Wis. Sts. 1921, secs. 23o4, 2307;
Wyo. Comp. Sts. 1920, secs. 4719, 4726.
Or. Rev. Laws, 192o, sec. 808, adds that "evidence therefore, of the agreement
shall not be received other than the writing or secondary evidence of its contents."
'Ark. Dig. of Sts. 1921, sec. 4862. In Georgia the agreement is not "binding
on the promisor." Code, 1911, sec. 3222.
'Ann. Code, 1897, sec. 4625.
Conn. Gen. Sts. 19o2, sec. 1o9o; Fla. Rev. Gen. Sts. 1920, sec. 3873; Hawaii,
Rev. Laws, 1915, sec. 2662; Mass. Rev. Laws, 19o2, ch. 74, see. 5; Hemingway's
Ann. Miss. Code, 1917, sec. 3123; Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, sec. 2170; S. C. Laws,
x912, sec. 3738.
" Calif. Civ. Code, 1915, secs. 1739, 1624 (4); Idaho, Comp. Sts. 1919, sec.
7976 (4); Burns' Ann. Ind. Rev. Sts. 1914, see. 7469; Me. Rev. Sts. 1916, .ch.
14, sec. 5; Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 11835; Mont. Rev. Code, 1921, sec.
7519(4), 7591; N. H. Pub. Sts. 19Ol, ch. 215, sec. 3; N. D. Comp. Laws, 1913,
sec. 5888; Okla. Comp. Laws, 1909, sec. io8g(4); S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec.
857; Vt. Gen. Laws, 1917, sec. 1877.
'Colo. Rev. Sts. 1908, sec. 2666(4); Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 6999; Neb.
Comp. Sts. i9o7, sec. 6028; Nev. Rev. Laws, 1912, sec. lO76; N. J. Comp. Sts.
1911, p. 2615,. sec. 6; N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9, ch. 41, sec. 31; Or. Laws, 1920,
sec. 808(5) ; Utah, Rev. Sts. 1898, sec. 2469; Wis. Sts. 1921, sec. 23o8; Wyo.
Comp. Sts. 191o, sec. 3752.
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In Iowa, on the other hand, it was provided again that "no evidence
is competent unless it be in writing."'
1
Many of the above states have adopted in recent years the Uniform
Sales Act, which has accepted the wording of the English Sale of Goods
Act, so that the contract is now "not enforceable by action," if the
requisites of the statute are not met."'
The different holdings by the American courts with -respect to the
statute of frauds from the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws cannot
be accounted for, however, solely by the above differences in the word-
ing of the statutes. Even where the wording of the statute was identi-
cal with that of the English statute not infrequently a different conclu-
sion has been reached from that of Leroux v. Brown, the English doc-
trine not being deemed sound on principle nor in harmony with the
requirements of business. The cases on the subject may be roughly
classified as follows:
(i) Some courts have been inclined to adopt the distinction sug-
gested by Leroux v. Brown,'9 according to which, if the statute of the
forum provides that "no action shall be brought" or words of similar
import, it is deemed to affect "procedure." In such jurisdictions no
contract not complying with the terms of the statute can be enforced,
even though such contract is valid and enforceable under the law of the
place of contracting, the law of the place of performance, and of the
situs of the property. On the other hand, if the contract is declared to
be "invalid" or "void," it is deemed to affect the "substance" of the con-
tract. Under such a statute the contract is not controlled by the internal
law of the forum, but by the law of the place of contracting, the law
of the place of performance, or the law of the situs of the property,
as the case may be. Contracts for the sale of goods were accordingly
"Ark. Dig. of Sts. 1921, sec. 4864. The Georgia statute provides that it
shall not be "binding on the promisor" [Code, 1911, sec. 3222(7)] and the Wash-
ington statute provides that the contract shall not "be good and valid" (Codes
& Sts. 191o, sec. 5290).
"Ann. Code, 1897, sec. 4625.
'Alaska, Laws, 1913, ch. 66, sec. 4; Ariz. Rev. Sts. 1913, sec. 5152, Conn. Gen.
Sts. 1918, sec. 6131; Idaho, Laws, 1919, ch. 149, sec. 4; Smith's Ill. Rev. Sts. 1921,
ch. 1212, sec. 4; Iowa, Laws, 1919, ch. 396, sec. 4; Md. Ann. Code 1911, art. 83,
sec. 25; Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. io6, sec. 6; Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, sec.
11835; Minn. Gen. Sts. Supp. 1917, sec. 6o15 (4); Neb. Comp. Sts. 1922, sec.
2473; Nev. Rev. Laws, 1919, p. 3034, sec. 4; N. J. Comp. Sts. 191o, p. 4648, sec.
4; N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1909, ch. 41, sec. 85 amended by Laws, 1911, ch. 571; N. D.
Laws, 1917, ch. 2o2, sec. 4; Ohio, Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 8384; Pa. Sts. 1920, sec.
19652; R. I. Gen. Laws, 19o9, p. 911, sec. 4; S. D. Laws, 1921, ch. 355, sec. 4;
Tenn. Laws, 1919, ch. 118, sec. 4; Utah, Comp. Laws, 1917, sec. 5113; Vt. Laws.
12i, No. 171, sec. 4; Wis. Sts. i921, sec. 1684t(4) (the old wording is still
found in sec. 2308); Wyo. Comp, Sts. 192o, sec. 4726.
", Third Nat. Bk. vt. Steel (1912) 129 Mich. 434, 88 N. W. 1050 (representations
as to credit of another); Kleeman & Co. vt. Collins (1872, Ky.) 9 Bush. 460
(contract not to be performed in a year).
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held by most courts to be controlled in the matter of the statute of
frauds by the le: loci contractus.2 0 In view of the change in the lai-
guage of the seventeenth section, introduced by the Uniform Sales Act,
the courts belonging to this group and sitting in states in which the Act
has been adopted, may feel compelled, on the ground of consistency, to
hold that the section in its new form affects procedure only.
(2) Another group of cases holds that the difference in the wording
of the fourth and seventeenth sections of the statute of frauds is purely
accidental and does not justify therefore a difference in the operative
effect of the sections. There is no agreement, however, as to whether
the statute affects "substance" or "procedure." Some courts agree with
the English courts and hold that both sections concern only the
"enforceability" of the contract, or "procedure," or prescribe the "evi-
dence" by which the agreement must be proved.21  Others, declining
to accept the English view, have reached the conclusion that both sec-
tions of the statute of frauds affect the "substance" of the contract,
which is controlled therefore also in this regard, from the standpoint of
the Conflict of Laws, by the law governing its substantive requirements
in general. 22  One of the leading cases supporting the latter view is
Cochran v. Ward, in which suit was brought in Indiana for the breach
of a parol lease of lands in the State of Illinois, the contract having been
entered into in the latter state. The Illinois statute of frauds provided
that "no action shall be brought to charge any person upon any contract
for the sale of lands . . . ., or any interest in or concerning them for
a longer term than one year, unless such contract, or some memorandum
or note thereof, shall be in writing ........ In answer to the argument
that the statute of frauds related to "procedure" and was controlled by
the internal law of the forum, the learned court said :23
"Hunt v. Jones (1879) 2 R. I. 265; Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co. (1886) 15
R. I. 380, 5 Atl. 632; Houghtaling v. Ball (1853) 19 Mo. 84, (1855) 20 Mo. 563;
Jones v. Nat. Cotton Oil Co. (1903) 31 Tex. Civ. App. 42o, 72 S. W. 248; Brock-
man Commission Co. v. Kilbourne (9o5) iii Mo. App. 542, 86 S. W. 275;
D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly (1914) 155 Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372; Franklin Sugar
Refining Co. v. Holstein Harvey's Sons, Inc. (1921, D. Del.) 275 Fed. 622.
'* Townsend v. Hargreaves (1875) 118 Mass. 325 (contract for sale of goods);
Bird v. Monroe (1877) 66 Me. 337 (contract for sale of goods).
" Cochran v. Ward (1892) 5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. E. 795, 31 N. E. 581 (parol
lease) ; Miller v. Wilson (1893) 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. IIii (contract for sale of
land); Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W.
lO82 (contract of guaranty); Matson v. Bauman (1918) 139 Minn. 296, 66
N. W. 343 (agreement to repurchase stock).
Judge Holt, in Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., supra note 22, said:
"We believe no distinction should be made between the two sections because
of the use of the language 'no action shall be maintained' in the one, and 'every
contract shall be void' in the other; but that the phrases, in the connection in
which they are used, mean one and the same thing, namely, to make a valid
contract in this state, concerning subjects mentioned in said sections, a writing
is required." 137 Minn. at p. 146, 162 N. W. at p. lO84.
23 (1892) 5 Ind. App. 89, 94-95, 29 N. E. 795, 797.
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"It is impossible to consider a contract separately from the remedy
given by the law for its enforcement, because it is this that supplies it
with legal vitality. The law is an essential factor in every contract, and
is presumed to be considered by the parties in their deliberations. If
the law of the place stamps upon an agreement the quality that it
shall be voidable, and that its performance shall be a pure matter of
conscience or grace with the parties, that quality becomes a part of the
substance of the agreement, and characterizes it wherever it may be.
A right without a remedy for its enforcement is a mere fiction. Thus
it was said by Swayne, J., for the court in Edwards v. Kearzey (1877)
96 U. S. 595, 'it is also the settled doctrine of this court that the laws
which subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter into and
form a part of it as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated
in its terms. This rule embraces alike those which affect its validity,
construction, discharge and enforcement.'
"At another place in the opinion the learned judge said: 'The obliga-
tion of. a contract includes everything within its obligatory scope.
Among these elements nothing is more important than its means of
enforcement. This is the breath of its vital existence. Without it the
contract, as such, in the view of the law, ceases to be, and falls into the
class of those imperfect obligations, as they are termed, which depend
for their fulfilment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom
they rest. The ideas of right and remedy are inseparable. "Want of
right and want of remedy are the same thing."'
"There can be no doubt, we think, that to the extent that the remedy
affects the validity and obligation of a contract it is imported into and
becomes an essential part of it, and characterizes it wherever it is the
subject-matter of litigation.
"The Illinois statute of frauds became part of the agreement in suit
and the provision that no action should be maintained for damages for
the breach of the agreement became as much a part of its character and
substance as if specifically incorporated therein. The right to defend
against a contract growing out of any of its inherent qualities, becomes
vested, and a right of property as much as the right to enforce any
other beneficial provision. Pritchard v. Norton (1882) io6 U. S. J24,
I Sup. Ct. lO2; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 362, 369.
"This doctrine does not conflict with the general rule that in matters
of procedure the le. fori controls. 'Procedure,' in this connection,
applies to the nature of the action, as whether it shall be covenant,
assumpsit,'debt, etc., to the rules of pleading and evidence, the order and
manner of trial and the nature and effect of process, and perhaps to all
other matters or remedy only, which are not incorporated into the
contract as affecting its nature and obligatory character. 2 4
"In the above case the law of the place of contracting and that of the situs
coincided. Where they differ, -the law is uncertain. There are a number of
earlier cases which appear to sustain the application of the law of the situs.
See Davenport v. Karnes (1873) 70 Ill. 467 (parol antenuptial contract) ; Abell
v,. Douglas (1847, N. Y.) 4 Denio, 305 (parol transfer of equitable interest) ;
Burrell v. Root (1869) 4o N. Y. 496 (contract of sale); Siegel v. Robinson
(1867) 56 Pa. ig (contract of sale) ; Bissell v. Terry (1873) 69 Ill. 184 (authori-
zation of agent to sell land) ; Marie v. Garrison (1883, N. Y. Super. Ct.) I3 Abb.
New. Cas. 210; Anderson v. May (1872, Tenn.) IO Heisk. 84 (oral lease for a
longer term than one year). The cases were decided, however, before Polson v.
Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211, 45 N. E. 737.
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(3) There is another group of cases in which the fourth or the
seventeenth section of the statute of frauds was passed upon without
any expression of opinion regarding the other section.
25
(4) According to another view the statute of frauds is regarded as
being based on moral grounds and as laying down a rule of public policy
in the face of which a foreign contract, though valid and enforceable
where made, cannot be enforced.
26
The federal courts deem themselves bound by the construction placed
upon the statute by the Supreme Court of the state.
27
CONTINENTAL LAw-Statutes analogous to the English statute of
frauds exist in certain continental countries, notably in those of the
The question was raised in the more recent case of Meylink v. Rhea (19o4)
123 Iowa, 3IO, 98 N. V. 779 (contract for sale of Iowa land); and the view
was there expressed that the law of the situs governs. The statement was not
necessary for the decision, however, because the law of the situs and the lex fori
coincided, and the evidence theory of the statute of frauds has been adopted
by statute in Iowa. See also Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co. (1896) 15o N. Y. 314,
44 N. E. 959.
As regards contracts not to be performed within a year and contracts of
guaranty, a similar uncertainty exists as to whether the law of the place of
contracting is applicable or that of the place of performance. No satisfactory
cases in point have been found. Turnow v. Hochstadter (1876, N. Y. Sup. Ct.)
7 Hun, 8o, and Garnes v. Frazier (19o9, Ky.) 118 S. W. 998, would apply the
law of the place of performance with respect to contracts not to be performed
within a year, but that law coincided again with the lex fori. Ringgold v.
Newkirk (1840) 3 Ark. 96, stated that the lex loci governed contracts of guaranty,
but the statement was made merely by way of contrast with the lex fori. The
contract was performable in the place of contracting.
' To the effect that the fourth section affects procedure or evidence see, in
addition to cases mentioned in notes ip and 21, Heaton v. Eldridge (1897) 56
Ohio St. 87, 46 N. E. 638 (agreement not to be performed within a year);
Buhl v. Stephens (1898 C. C. Ind.) 84 Fed. 922; Boone v. Coe (1913) 153 Ky.
233, 154 S. W. 900 (contract for lease of land) ; Downer v. Chesebrough (1869)
36 Conn. 39.
To the effect that the fourth section affects the substance of the contract see,
in addition to cases falling within this section, mentioned in note 22, Fox v.
Matthews (1857) 33 Miss. 433 (contract for sale of slave); Abell v. Douglas
(1847, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 4 Denio, 305 (contract for sale of land); Anderson v.
May (1872, Tenn.) Io Heisk. 84 (contract for lease of land); Wolf v. Burke
(1893) 18 Colo. 264, 32 Pac. 427 (contract for sale of land) ; Howell v. North
(1913) 93 Neb. 505, 14o N. W. 779 (contract for sale of land).
To the effect that the seventeenth section affects the substantive rights of the
parties, see Hunt v. Jones (1879) 12 R. I. 265; Houghtaling v. Ball (1853) 19
Mo. 84, (1855)'20 MO. 563; Kling v. Fries (1876) 33 Mich. 275; Brockman
Commission Co. v. Kilbourne (19o5) iii Mo. App. 542, 86 S. W. 275; Canale v.
Pauly (1914) 155 Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372; Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Holstein
Harvey's Sons Inc. (1921, D. Del.) 275 Fed. 622.
'Barbour v. Campbell (1917) lo Kan. 616, 168 Pac. 879. See also Emery v.
Burbank (1895) 163 Mass. 326, 39 N. E. 1O26.
'Buhl v. Stephens (1898, C. C. Ind.) 84 Fed. 922; Hotel Woodward v. Ford
Motor Co. (1919, C. C. A. 2d) 258 Fed. 322.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Code Napoleon. No contract involving more than 150 francs or lire
can be proved, according to the provisions of the French28 and Italian29
Civil Codes, exclusively by parol testimony if the contract is civil and
not commercial. In Austria and Germany, on the other hand, there is
no similar legislation, all ordinary parol contracts being enforceable.
AUSTRiA-A contract falling within Article 1341 of the French Civil
Code, which has been executed in Paris, will be enforced by the
Austrian courts notwithstanding the absence of all written proof.80
The Austrian courts say that the mode of proof is governed by the law
of the forum and that the Austrian provisions relating to proof must
therefore control. In reality the courts appear to be influenced by
considerations of policy. As the contract was valid, though unenforce-
able, under the law of the place of contracting, and would have been
both valid and enforceable, if it had been made within the territory of
the forum, it seemed reasonable to the Austrian courts that such a con-
tract should be enforced.
GERMANY-The German courts have taken the same view as the
Austrian courts and for identical reasons. 1
ITALY-The law of Italy is found in Article Io of the Preliminary
Dispositions of the Civil Code which provides as follows: "The means
of proof of obligations are determined by the laws of the state in which
the act was done."
For example, an oral contract of guaranty for less than 15o lire
entered into in the United States and not complying with the statute of
frauds of the place of contracting would therefore be unenforceable in
Italy, notwithstanding the fact that it would have been valid and
enforceable under Article 1341 of the Italian Civil Code. On the other
hand, an oral contract of sale for $ioo would be enforceable in Italy,
if it satisfied the lex loci, although there was no written evidence as
required by Article 1341 of the Italian Civil Code. ,
FRANcE-There is no Code provision similar to that of Article 1O of
the Preliminary Dispositions of the Civil Code of Italy, but the same
conclusion has been reached by the courts. The leading case is Benton
v. Horeau, decided by the Court of Cassation in 188o.32 A contract had
been entered into in England involving more than 150 francs. The
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that no writing was required by
English law and that the contract could be proved in England by oral
testimony. The testimony was excluded by the trial court which relied
upon Article 1341 of the French Civil Code. It was of the opinion
"Art. 1341, French Civil Code.
'Art. 1341, Italian Civil Code.
"Supreme Court, April I5, 1911, 8 Revue de Droit International Privi (I912)
x47; Jan. 25, 1911, cited by Walter, Internationales Privatrecht (I92i) i9g8.
' Obertribunal Stuttgart, Sept. 25, 1858, 13 Seuffert's Archiv No. 182.
' Aug. 24, i88o, Dalloz, i88o, , 447 (I88o) 7 Clunet, 480.
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that written evidence was required by the code not only in the interest
of the parties, but in the interest of public order and public morality, the
object of the provision being the prevention of multiplicity of suits.
On the appeal Advocate General Desjardins urged before the Court of
Cassation the following points: First. That the application of the law
of the place of contracting to the mode of proof resulted as a necessary
corollary from the adoption of the lex loci as the law governing the
formal validity of contracts (locus regit actum), the mode of proof
going ad litis decisionent, that is, to the rights and merits of the case.
He relied in this connection upon several decisions of the Parliament of
Paris which had taken this view with reference to a similar provision
contained in the Ordinance Des Moulins.33 Second. That Article
1341 did not establish a rule of public policy, precluding the enforce-
ment of a foreign contract, valid where made, which did not comply
with its provisions. Third. That the enforcement by the courts of
other states of a contract valid and enforceable under the lex loci would
give effect to the intention of the parties, which governs in the matter
of contracts.
The Court of Cassation adopted the conclusions of M. Desjardins
and held that the mode of proof should be governed by English law,
there being no French public policy opposed thereto.34
SOUTH AMERIcA-The rule that the means of proof are governed by
the law of the place where the contract was made appears to be
recognized generally in Latin America. 35
II
Before considering whether the English case of Leroux v. Brown
or the decision by the French Court of Cassation in the case of Benton
This provision, which was the prototype of Art. 1341 of the French Civil
Code, required evidence in writing whenever the amount involved in a contract
exceeded one hundred pounds.
"To the same effect Beaulieu v. Roy, Trib. Civ. de la Seine, June 12, 1887,
(1887) 14 Clhnet, 332; Rich y Trutana v. Suarez de Mendoza, Trib. Civ. de la
Seine, Feb. 9, 19o6 (9o8) 35 Clunet, 1132; Lord Abdy v. Lady Abdy, Cass.
June 14, 1899, (1899) 26 Clunet, 804, Dalloz, 1900, 1, 45; Abdy v. Lady Abdy,
App. Amiens, March 15, 19oo, (ioo) 27 Clunet, 977; affirmed by Court of
Cassation, Feb. 6, 19o5, Dalloz, 89o5, 1, 481; see also Princess Ronkia & Prince
Fahar Ben Aiad v. Kramer, Cass. May 23, 1892, (1892) 89 Clunet, 1176; Begg
v. Le Curateur de 1'Arondissement de Fort de France, Court of Martinique, May
18, 1878, (1878) 5 Clunet, 507.
"Art 12, Intr. Brazilian Civil Code; art. 47 Brazilian Bills of Exchange Act
(19o8) ; Carrio, Apuntes de Derecho Internacional Privado (1911) 384; Verdia,
Tratado elemental de Derecho Internacional Privado (19o8) 3o2; Restrepo-
Hernandez, Derecho Internacional Privado (914) 532.
Art. 2 of the Convention on Civil Procedure, concluded at Montevideo, pro-
vides: "The proofs will be admitted and appreciated according to the law of the
place which governs the juridical act giving rise to the litigation.
"Excepted from this provision are modes of proof which, by reason of their
nature, are not authorized by the law of the place where the action is brought."
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v. Horeau represents the better doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, it will
be expedient to study the American decisions other than those relating
to the Conflict of Laws, which throw light upon the nature of the statute
of frauds. The unsatisfactory state of our law in the matter of the
statute of frauds in its relation to the Conflict of Laws has resulted
largely from the confusion in the decisions relating to the nature of the
statute in general. If it can be shown by a proper analysis of the cases
that the statute of frauds affects the substance of the contract and not
merely procedure, the greatest stumbling-block in the way of a proper
solution of our problem from the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws
will have been removed.
From the standpoint of internal law it has been held (i) that a con-
tract not complying with the terms of the statute is void; (2) that such
a contract is voidable; (3) that the contract is unenforceable. Those
supporting the third view disagree again as to (a) whether the statute
of frauds involves a rule of evidence; (b) whether it lays down a rule
of remedial procedure; or (c) whether it affects the substance of the
contract.
Let us consider these different views and try to ascertain the extent to
which they are consistent with the decisions of our courts relating to
the statute of frauds. We may test the matter by an examination of the
following propositions; which most of the courts support:
(i) The note or memorandum may be executed at any time before
suit is brought, but not later.38
(2) The statute may be satisfied although the writing is not made
by the parties as the expression of their agreement. A letter to a third
party may be sufficient,37 or a letter repudiating the agreement after
stating the terms of the bargain.
3 8
(3) An oral agreement within the statute of frauds will be enforced
unless the statute is affirmatively pleaded.39
(4) The defendant may admit that there was an oral contract and
yet rely on the statute."0
'8 Bird v. Munroe (1877) 66 Me. 337; Thayer v. Luce (1871) 22 Ohio St. 62;
Sheehy v. Fulton (1894) 38 Neb. 691, 57 N. W. 395; White v. Dahlquist Mfg.
Co. (19O1) 179 Mass. 427, 6o N. E. 791; Mladich v. McEneely (1918) 212 Ill. App.
435; see also Bill v. Bament (1841, Exch.) 9 M. & W. 36.
' Jacobson v. Hendricks (igio) 83 Conn. 120, 75 Atl. 85; Spangler v. Danforth
(1872) 65 Ill. 152; Marks v. Cowdin (1919) 226 N. Y. 138, 193 N. E. 139; see
also Gibson v. Holland (1865) L. R. i C. P. i.
' Dury v. Young (1882) 58 Md. 546; Louisville Asphalt Varnish Co. v. Lorick
(1888) 29 S. C. 533, 8 S. E. 8; Willis v. Imperial Underwear Co. (igi6 Sup. Ct.)
159 N. Y. Supp. 729; see also Bailey v. Sweeting, supra note 7.
39I Williston, Contracts (1921) l17. There is much disagreement concerning
the manner of taking advantage of the statute. In many jurisdictions the defen-
dant may do so under the general issue. See Page, Contracts (2d ed. i92o) sec.
1418; Ann. Cas. 1912 D. 46, note.
, Carpenter v. Murphy (IN9S) 40 S. D. 280, 167 N. W. 175.
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(5) Although the contract is not enforceable, it may be proved if
its relation to the suit is collateral only."
(6) The statute of frauds does not affect contracts made prior to its
enactment.
42
Do the above propositions lend color to the view 'that the contract is
void? Manifestly not. A void contract is a contract without legal
effect. The propositions above set forth show conclusively that a con-
tract not satisfying the statute of frauds is not destitute of legal effect.43
There are many cases, nevertheless, which inaccurately describe such a
contract as void. Such statements are generally made in connection,
with statutes declaring a contract not complying with the terms of the
statute as "invalid" or "void," but sometimes also when the statute
provides that "no action shall be brought."44  The result in these cases
is generally the same as would follow if the contract were regarded as
"voidable" 45 or "unenforceable.
46
If a contract not satisfying the statute of frauds is not void, should
it be deemed to be "voidable" or merely "unenforceable"?
.. .... A voidable contract," says Anson, "is a contract with a flaw
of which one of the parties may, if he please, take advantage. If he
chooses to affirm, or if he fails to use his power of avoidance within a
reasonable time so that the position of parties becomes altered, or if he
takes a benefit under the contract, or if third parties acquire rights
under it, he will be bound by it."
47
"The difference between what is voidable, and what is unenforceable
is mainly a difference between substance and procedure. A contract
may be good, but incapable of proof owing to lapse of time, want of
written form, or failure to affix a revenue stamp. Writing in the first
cases, a stamp in the last, may satisfy the requirements of law and
render the contract enforceable, but it is never at any time in the power
"Vaught v. Pettyjohn (igig) 104 Kan. 174, 178 Pac. 623; Wilheln v. Herron
(192o) 211 Mich. 339, 178 N. W. 769; Grisham v. Lutric (1898) 76 Miss. 444,
24 So. i69; Perkins v. Ailnut (1913) 47 Mont. 13, 13o Pac. i; Coe v. Griggs
(1882) 76 Mo. 69.
'Keefe v. Keefe (1912) i9 Calif. App. 310, 125 Pac. 929; Wilson v. Owens
(1897), 1 Ind. Terr. 163, 38 S. W. 976; Chaffe v. Benoit (1882) 6o Miss. 34;
Dunn v. Tharp (1845) 39 N. C. 7; Hodges v. Johnson (855) 15 Tex. 570;
Collin v. Kittelberger (1916) 193 Mich. 33, 159 N. W. 482; McGavock v.
Ducharne (1916) 192 Mich. 99, 158 N. W. 173; Dean v. Willians (191o) 56
Wash. 614, io6 Pac. 130; contra: Baker v. Herudon (1855) 17 Ga. 568; Kingley
v. Cousins (186o) 47 Me. 91.
' Such a verbal agreement was regarded in the light of a continuing offer by
Bigelow, J., in Marsh v. Hyde (1855, Mass.) 3 Gray, 331, which becomes binding
upon compliance with the statute. If that were so, all the elements of a con-
tract would have to exist at the time of the making of the note or memorandum.
This is not the law, however.
":2 Page, op. cit. supra note 39, sec. 1400.
'Ibid. sec. 1398.
"Ibid. sec. 1399.
'Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. 1919) 19.
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of either party to avoid the transaction. The contract is unimpeachable,
only it cannot be proved in court."48
According to Anson the statute of frauds would render the contract
not complying with its terms "unenforceable" rather than "voidable."
Professor Corbin in his notes to the above passages from Anson
agrees with his conclusion, but takes exception to the statement that the
difference between a "voidable" and an "unenforceable" contract "is
mainly a difference between substance and procedure." Says Professor
Corbin :49
"In the case of a voidable contract, the acts of the parties operate to
create new legal relations. These are usually described as including
present rights and duties just as in the case of a valid contract, but
subject to the power of avoidance at the will of one of the parties.
Another way of describing a voidable contract is to say that there are
no contractual rights or duties existing'but that one of the parties has
an irrevocable power to create them.
"The term unenforceable contract includes both void contracts and
voidable contracts after avoidance. The author uses the term so as to
describe certain other legal relations. When a contract has become
unenforceable by virtue of the statute of limitations, the obligor or
debtor has a power to create a new right in the other party as against
himself by a mere expression of his will and without going through the
formalities of contract. He cannot, however, as in a voidable contract,
destroy the existing rights of the other party or create new rights in
himself as against that other. When a contract is unenforceable by
reason of the statute of frauds, either party has the legal power to
create rights as against himself by signing a written memorandum, he
has no such power to create rights in his own favor. The case of the
revenue stamp is somewhat different. In these cases a legal relation
exists that is different from that existing in the case of a void contract
or of a voidable one. It appears that this difference is not as the author
says 'mainly a difference between substance and procedure.' The dif-
ference between a power to create a right against another person and a
power to create a right against only oneself is not merely procedural."
In the light of the foregoing a contract not satisfying the require-
ments of the statute of frauds is neither void nor voidable, but merely
unenforceable. The important question remains, however, whether
such lack of enforceability results from a rule of evidence, from a rule
of remedial procedure, or from a rule of substantive law.
It is often said that a contract not complying with the statute of
frauds is unenforceable for want of proper evidence. Anson appears
to entertain this view. Browne" also, the learned writer on the
' Ibid ig-2o.
"Ibid. 20; see also Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting
Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 16q, 179-181.
'Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th ed. 1895) sec. 115, and note. In Iowa this
view has been adopted expressly by legislation. Ann. Code, 1897, sec. 4625. As
regards contracts for the sale of goods, the Uniform Sales Act has now substi-
tuted "shall not be enforceable by action" for the former provision. Iowa,
Laws, i919, ch. 396, sec. 4.
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statute of frauds, has been instrumental in giving currency to this
doctrine, which has been expressly adopted also in Iowa by statute.
"In previous editions of this treatise," says Browne, "the operation
of the statute has been defined, as the prescription of a rule of evidence.
It is still believed that this view is the true one, and that cases which
are inconsistent with it rest upon uncertain ground."51
Notwithstanding the strong support which the above theory has
received, it cannot be approved. The evidence theory is out of har-
mony with the propositions above mentioned. For example, most
courts hold that a memorandum made after the suit has been started
does not satisfy the statute.52 If the statute prescribed merely a rule
of evidence a different result would have to be reached. The fact also
that a parol agreement within the statute of frauds may be proved for
purposes other than that of enforcing it shows that the want of
enforceability does not result from a rule of evidence.53 Were it true
that the statute of frauds lays down a rule of evidence, a contract not
complying with its requirements could not have been shown for any
purpose.
The question remains therefore whether the statute of frauds lays
down a rule of remedial procedure or whether it affects the substance of
the contract. In this country Mr. Justice Loring5 and Professor Wil-
liston55 have taken the former view, while Professor Corbin56 has
reached the opposite conclusion.
Can it be said that any one of the six propositions above mentioned,
which the courts have laid down with respect to the statute of frauds,
indicates that the statute is one of remedial procedure? The answer
will depend of course upon the ddfinition of the terms "substance" and
"procedure." If substantive law be regarded as defining rights, while
procedure determines remedies, the statute of frauds would have to be
classified as one of procedure. Salmond shows, however, that the
above distinction between jus and renmedium is inadmissible, for, as he
points out, there are, on the one hand, many rights belonging to the
sphere of procedure, and on the other hand, a rule defining the remedy
may be as much a part of the substantive law as are those which define
the right itself.
"To define procedure as concerned not with rights, but with reme-
'Browne, op. cit. supra note 50, sec. Ix5a, note i. See also Heaton v. Eldridge
(1897) 56 Ohio St. 87, 99, 46 N. E. 638, 639; Buthl v. Stephens (1898, C. C. Ind.)
84 Fed. 922; Crane v. Powell (1893) 139 N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. gii.
See Proposition I, supra p. 321.
See Proposition 5, supra p. 322.
' (1875) 9 Am. L. RFv. 453.
'Williston, Sales (igog) sec. 7'; I Williston, Contracts (920) sec. 527.
Cases on Contracts (1921) 1475, note. See also Lorenzen, Validity of Wills,
Deeds and Contracts as regards Form in the Conflict of Laws (I9ii) 2o YA~M
LAw JouiRNAL, 427, 461.
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dies," says the learned writer,5 7 "is to confound the remedy with the
process by which it is made available.
.... The law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the
law which governs the process of litigation. It is the law of actions-
jus quod ad actiones pertinet-using the term action in a wide sense to
include all legal proceedings, civil or criminal. All the residue is sub-
stantive law, and relates not to the process of litigation, but to its
ptrposes and subject-matter. Substantive law is concerned with the
ends which the administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals
with the means and instruments by which those ends are to be attained."
Expressing the .latter in a somewhat different way, we may say that
"substance" includes all rules determining the legal relations which the
courts will declare when all facts have been made known to them,
whereas. "procedure" relates to the process or machinery by which the
facts are made known to the courts.
Speaking of the statute of frauds, Salmond makes the following
observations :58
"An exclusive evidential fact is practically equivalent to a constitu-
uent element in the title of the right to be proved. The rule of evidence
that a contract can be proved only by a writing corresponds to a rule
of substantive law that a contract is void unless reduced to writing. In
the former case the writing is the exclusive evidence of title; in the
latter case it is part of the title itself. In the former case the right
exists but is imperfect, failing in its remedy through defect of proof.
In the latter case it fails to come into existence at all. But for most
purposes this distinction is one of form rather than of substance."
As shown above, a contract within the statute of frauds and not
complying with its terms is not void. Salmond's statement that such a
contract is void is therefore not strictly accurate. The statute confers
on the party who has not signed a memorandum or satisfied the seven-
teenth section in some other manner, a legal "privilege" not to perform
what he has orally promised. One additional fact is required to make
the contract perfect-the signing of the memorandum, or, if the case
falls within the seventeenth section, the acceptance of part of the goods
or the giving of earnest money to bind the contract, or in part payment.
The party who has not signed the memorandum has the legal "power,"
by signing such memorandum, of creating in himself a legal duty to
perform. The rule that a note or memorandum may be executed at
any time before suit is brought, but not later, determines merely the
tine when the operative facts may come into existence. All agree that
the "cause of action" mpust exist when suit is brought. "Cause of
action" means the necessary operative facts to the creation of present
or instant duty. Evidently a writing is one of these facts. The rule
that the statute may be satisfied although the writing is not made by the
Salmond, Jurisprudence (6th ed. 192o) 437-438.
'Ibid. 439.
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parties as the expression of their agreement, defines the sort of fact that
the law on grounds of social policy permits to have operative effect,
showing the purpose with which the note or memorandum is made to be
immaterial. The rule that an oral agreement within the statute of frauds
will be enforced unless the defense is affirmatively pleaded is of course
a rule of procedure, indicating which party must make known to the
court the existence or non-existence of the wrting. A similar rule
exists with respect to contributory negligence, illegality, etc. But this
does not prove that the statute of frauds, contributory negligence and
illegality are procedural. The rule that a contract, although not
enforceable because of the statute of frauds, may be proved for other
purposes, shows that the statute does not embody a rule of evidence,
which would exclude oral testimony in all cases. The rules also that
the defendant may admit the execution of the contract and yet rely on
the statute and that the statute of frauds does not affect contracts made
prior to its enactment, indicate that the statute affects the substance of
the contract.
All of the above goes to show that the lack of enforceability of the
oral contract does not result from the violation of a rule of evidence,
nor because the requirement of a written memorandum belongs to the
process by which the operative facts are made known to the courts, but
because a rule of substantive law has decreed that no rights or duties
shall arise in the absence of such a memorandum. As the plaintiff has
no legal right, but simply a beneficial liability, his offer to prove an oral
contract is necessarily excluded, it being irrelevant to the issue raised by
the plea of the statute of frauds. It is manifest, however, that as the
statute of frauds determines the legal relations resulting from offer and
acceptance, it affects substance and not merely procedure. This is true
without reference to the particular wording of the statute, that is,
whether it provides that "no action shall be brought," that the contract
"shall not be allowed to be good," or that it shall be "invalid" or
"void." 59
Even if it were conceded for the sake of argument that the statute
of frauds falls fairly within the definition of a procedural rule, it
would not follow that it may not be "substantive" as well. If sub-
stantive law be defined in the traditional manner as "rules determining
' If the nature of the statute of frauds were dependent upon the specific word-
ing of the statute, whether it read that "no action shall be brought" or that the
contract is to be "invalid" in the absence of a written memorandum, we might
have the singular result that a contract unenforceable under the law of the place
of contracting and void under the law of the forum will nevertheless be enforced.
The statute of the forum would be inapplicable because the contract was made
outside of the jurisdiction and the statute of the place of contracting would be
disregarded on the ground that the procedural laws of a state are not entitled
to extraterritorial recognition and enforcement. See Marie v. Garrisonr, supra
note 24, at p. 279; Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. I9O5) 1445-1446.
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rights and duties," it is evident that the statute of frauds falls also
within that definition. The test of a right-duty relationship is whether
or not the breach of the duty is remediable. From this it follows that
a 9tatute affecting the entire existence of a legal remedy in a given
state of facts is a rule determining rights and duties. If this be true,
there is no reason why, if sound policy requires it, the statute of frauds
should not be controlled by the le% loci contractus in the Conflict of
Laws.
III
From the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws there is the greatest need
of restricting the term 'procedure" to its proper signification, for,
according to the traditional rule in this subject, all matters of proce-
dure are submitted to the law of the forum. English and American
courts have been too prone to say in the past that a particular matter
belonged to procedure, and that it was controlled therefore by the law
of the forum. They have given to the term a very wide meaning,60
with the consequence, that many matters, which on principle and accord-
ing to the established practice of other countries should be governed by
some other law, are subjected to the law of the place where the suit
happens to be brought. The reason for this attitude on the part of the
Anglo-American courts is not far to seek. The tendency of the com-
mon law has always been to be exclusive. It is no wonder, therefore,
that when the English courts were first asked to enforce rights
"created" by a foreign system of law, the civil law, they should welcome
any doctrines which would operate restrictively in the recognition and
enforcement of such rights. They willingly accepted therefore the
doctrine of the Dutch school which gave to the term "procedure" a very
extensive meaning. 1 By subjecting to the law of the forum all matters
belonging to procedure and giving that term the widest possible mean-
ing, the field for the application of "foreign law" became necessarily
reduced. It was natural also that the continental countries, whose
jurisprudence rests upon a common basis, the Roman law, should have
been the first to apply a more liberal doctrine with reference to each
other. There is no good reason, however, why, after an acquaintance-
ship with the continental system extending over a period of a century
and more, the Anglo-American courts should not be willing to give to
"foreign rights" the same effect that they have abroad.
So far as the process or machinery for the enforcement of "foreign"
rights is concerned, each litigant must of course take it as he finds it, and
o "English lawyers give the widest possible extension to the meaning of the
term 'procedure.' The expression, as interpreted by our judges, includes all
legal remedies, and everything connected with the enforcement of a right."
Dicey, Contflict of Laws (3d ed. 1922) 762.
See Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflict Legum in Wigmore's Celebration Legal
Essays (i919) 214.
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so far as he is prejudiced thereby it is a loss which cannot be avoided.
It is impossible to set up a special machinery for "foreign" causes of
action that may be brought before a domestic court. "Foreign" sub-
stantive rights, however, should be enforced according to their original
content. As regards the statute of frauds, there is no more difficulty
in establishing its legal effect abroad than there is in proving the legal
effect of any other foreign operative facts.
Much difficulty may be experienced in a given case in determining
whether effect should be given to the foreign operative facts, but this
is hardly true so far as they relate to the statute of frauds. The very
fact that there are in the United States so many decisions involving the
Conflict of Laws which have held that the statute affects the substantive
rights of the parties would go to show the existence of a policy that a
foreign contract should be controlled, as regards the statute of frauds, by
the law governing such contract in other respects. Some of these deci-
sions, it is true, base their conclusion upon the particular wording of the
statute, which stated that a contract not complying with its terms should
be "invalid" or "void," but it is safe to assume that the special wording
of the statute was seized upon merely to support a conclusion which
had been reached on other grounds, namely, the reasonable require-
ments of the situation. Moreover, in a number of strong decisions the
same result was reached although the particular statute provided that
"no action shall be brought." The authors also who have examined
the problem from the standpoint of the actual requirements of interstate
or international business, instead of disposing of it in a more or less
mechanical manner, have felt the reasonableness of the doctrine laid
down by the French Court of Cassation in Benton v. Horeau and the
unreasonableness of the rule adopted by Leroux v. Brown.6 2 When a
valid contract has been entered into in a certain state or country, which
does not require a memorandum in writing, justice would seem to
require the enforcement of the contract elsewhere. A non-resident
of the state in which such contract was made should not be allowed to
set up the statute of frauds of his residence if he fails to live up to the
contract and suit has to be brought against him in the state of his resi-
dence. A person who in the execution of a contract has shown the care
which is required by the lex loci should have the assurance that his
interests will be protected by the courts of other states. As the failure
to secure a written memorandum cannot be regarded as negligent in
the above case, the law of the place of execution not requiring a written
memorandum, sound policy would seem to require the enforcement of
the contract abroad, without regard to the existence of a different local
provision in the jurisdiction in which the suit may be brought. It is to
be hoped therefore that the states which have adopted the Uniform
Sales Act will not be misled by the fact that it has accepted in the matter
"See Williston, Sales (igog) sec. 126; 1 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 6oo.
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of the statute of frauds the wording of the English Sale of Goods
Act, so as to conclude that the erroneous doctrine of Leroux v. Brown
must be followed.
63
The conclusion reached is supported not only by strong American
authority, but also by the law of continental" and South Americans
countries, and by the opinion of the great majority of foreign jurists. 66
There is no reason why even the courts of those states in which it is
' The correct view has been taken in Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie (1921)
270 Pa. 221, 113 Atl. 202; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Holstein Harvey's Sons
Inc., supra note 20.
Supra p. 3ig. The law of Austria and Germany is opposed, but these coun-
tries have no legislation similar to our statute of frauds. The contrary view
leads therefore in these countries to the enforcement of foreign contracts which
are valid but unenforceable under the law of the place of execution.
'Supra p. 320.
'A distinction is made between the "mode" of proof and its "administration."
The former is deemed to go to the substance and the latter as belonging to
procedure. Asser & Rivier, Eliments de Droit International Priv6 (1884)
167-168; Audinet, Principes Elimentaires de Droit International Priv6 (2d ed.
19o6) 364; Bar, International Law (Gillespie's transl. 1892) 864; Bard, Precis
de Droit International Priv6 (1883) 312; Bourdon-Viane & Magron, Manuel
Elmentaire de Droit International Priv6 (1883) 297; Carrio, Apuntes de
Derecho Internacional Privado (1911) 384; 3 Catellani, Il Diritto Internazionale
Privato (1888) 586; (1905) 32 Clunet, 453 (1905) 453; 2 Conde y Luque,
Derecho Internacional Privado (9o7) 378; Despagnet & de Boeck, Pricis de
Droit International Priv6 (5th ed. 1909) 534; Diena, Printcipii di Diritto Inter-
nazionale Privato (1910) 374, 376-377; Donnedieu de Vabres, L'Evolution de la
Jurisprudence Franj~aise en Mati~re de Conflits des Lois (1905) 217; Duguit,"
Des Conflits de Lggislations Relatifs a la Forme des Actes Civils (1882) I25
Esperson (1884) II Clunet, 175; 1 Fiore, Le Droit International Privg (Antoine's
transl. 19o7) 215-216; I Foelix, Traiti de Droit Internatioial Privi "(4th ed.
1866) 453; Foignet, Manuel Elimentaire de Droit Interiational Privi (6th ed.
1921) 342; Gestoso y Acosta, Nuevo Tratado de Derecho Procesal, Civil,
Mercantil y Penal Internacional (1912) 336; Kosters, Het Internationaal Bur-
gerlijk Recht in Nederland (1917) 205; 8 Laurent, Le Droit Civil International
(188) 40; 2 Mass6, Le Droit Commercial dans ses Rapports avec le Droit 4es
Gens et le Droit Commercial (2d ed. 1861) 42; Meili, Das Internationale Civil-
prozessrecht (i9o6) 407; Pillet, Principes de Droit International Priv6 (19o3)
489; Restrepo-Hernandez, Derecho Internacional Privado (1914) 532; Rodrigues
Pereia, Projecto de Codigo de Direito Internacional Privado (1911) art. 78, pp.
42-43; 3 Rolin, Principes de Droit International Priv6 (1897) 2-3; Surville &
Arthuys, Cours Elimentaire de Droit Inuernational Priv6 (6th ed. 1915) 6o2;
Synnestvedt, Le Droit International Privi de la Scandinavie (1904) 291; Torres
Campos, Elementos de Derecho Internacional Privado ( 4th ed. 1913) 359; Valery,
Manuel de Droit International Privi (1914) 755; 2 Vareilles-Sommi&res,
Synth~se de Droit International Privg (1897) 284; Verdia, Tratado Elemental
de Derecho Internacional Privado (19o8) 3o2; Weiss, Manuel de Droit Inter-
national Privi (6th ed. 19o9) 655-656; 5 Weiss, Traiti de Droit International
Priv6 (2d ed. 1913) 509-512.
The Institute of International Law has expressed the same view. 2 Annuaire
de l'I'stitut de Droit International (1878) 151.
A few writers would submit both questions to the lex fori. Beauchet, Dit
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established, as regards internal law, that the statute of frauds affects
procedure, should not apply the lex loci contractus in the Conflict of
Laws. Theterm "procedure" may have one meaning in matters of
internal law, and a narrower meaning from the point of view of the
Conflict of Laws. A precedent for this has been furnished us by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the matter of "penal" laws. It
is a well recognized principle in the Conflict of Laws that rights arising
by virtue of a penal statute are not enforceable extraterritorially. In
Huntington v. Attrill6 7 the Supreme Court recognizes that the term
"penal" may have a much wider meaning for purposes of internal law
than it should have in the Conflict of Laws, that a statute might be
"penal" for local purposes and yet "create" rights which should be
enforced internationally. Instead of accepting a definition of what con-
stitutes a "penal" law which had been found suitable for the needs of
internal law and applying that definition mechanically in the field of the
Conflict of Laws, it took the correct position of determining in the first
place what sound policy demanded from the standpoint of the Conflict
of Laws and of thereupon defining the term "penal" in a way to attain
the end in view. Should the liability of directors imposed by statute for
a failure to file certain reports be enforced by the courts of other states?
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that it should, and it framed for
Conflit des Lois Frangaise et Etrang re en Mati~re de Preuve Testimoniale
(1892) ig Clunet, 359; I Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) 247; Mittermaier,
13 ARcHiv Fif'R DiE CIVILISTiScHE PRAxis (1830) 316; Schiiffner, Entwickehng
des internationalen Privatrechts (1841) 2o5; Jettel, Handbuch des internationalen
Privat- und Strafrechts (1893) 150; I Unger, Systemn des osterreichischen
Prvatrecshts (1892) 208; Wach, Handbuch des deutschen Civilprozessrechts
(1885) 127; Walker, Internationales Privatrechts (1921) 198.
Referring to the French provision (art. 1341 of the Civil Code), Bar says:
"It is plain that in such a case the question is not one as to the weight of
evidence in the true sense, i. e., as to whether the judge is persuaded of the
truth of the alleged facts by the materials laid before him-but is rather one
as to the form of the transaction and the consequences that attach to the neglect
ofthat form. This is obvious from the fact that, failing an admission by the
defender, the pursuer must lose his action, even although far stronger evidence
than that which is required should be tendered-e. g., instead of a private docu-
ment; ten witnesses who with one voice speak to the agreement of the parties."
International Law (Gillespie's transl. 1892) 864.
"The exercise of a right is assured in a complete manner only if its existence
can be proved in case of contest. The mode of proof is inseparable from the
right itself ..... There is a close connection between the right and the means
by which its existence is proved, and it is this connection which our opponents
fail to recognize." Asser & Rivier, Eliments de Droit International Privi (1884)
167-168.
"The object of these laws is to compel the parties to prepare the best proof,
and to punish them, if they have not done so ..... .But such a law cannot,
without unjust retroactivity, be applied to an omission which occurred in a
country where it was permissible and lawful." 2 Vareilles-Sommi~res, Synthse
de Droit International Privi (1897) 284-285.
" (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224.
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that purpose an international definition of what constitutes a "penal"
law.68  In the same way, as regards the statute of frauds. The good
policy of enforcing a foreign contract which is valid and enforceable
under the foreign law being apparent, the term "procedure" should be
defined in a way to exclude therefrom questions involving the statute of
frauds.
May it not be, however, that the suggested narrower definition of
"procedure" in the Conflict of Laws is impossible, in view of the estab-
lished law in the matter of the statute of limitations? This argument
was made by counsel in Leroux v. Browun and the opinion of Maule, J.,
shows that it had great weight with the court. In this country also the
doctrine that the ordinary statute of limitations is deemed to affect pro-
cedure and to be subject therefore to the lex fori has had a tendency to
fasten the same doctrine upon our courts in the matter of the statute of
frauds. We have seen, however, that a good many courts in dealing
with the statute of frauds have declined to be bound by the suggested
analogy. Analytically the statute of limitations and the statute of
frauds present more or less the same problem. Upon principle both
affect the substantive rights, duties, privileges, etc., of the parties. 9
The contrary became, however, early established in the Conflict of Laws
of both England and the United States as regards the statute of limita-
tions. 70 On the continent, on the contrary, both are deemed, by the
French and other courts, to go to the substance and to be controlled by
the law governing the substantive rights of the parties.71  Story also
originally took the view that a cause of action barred by the law of the
state or country governing it in other respects should be regarded as
barred everywhere else.72 Although Story's view did not prevail in our
courts, it is significant that in this country it has been adopted through
legislation in many states. In the matter of statutory causes of action
also the fundamental rule is frequently abandoned and the time within
which suit must be brought regarded as a substantive part of the cause
of action.7 3  All this goes to show that if the question were res integra
policy might demand, to the extent indicated, a recognition of the statute
of limitations existing at the place whose law controls the transaction in
' So also Huntington v. Attrill [1893, P. C.] A. C. 150.
' "The limitation of actions is the procedural equivalent of the prescription
of rights. The former is the operation of time in severing the bond between right
and remedy; the latter is the operation .of time in destroying the right. The
former leaves an imperfect right subsisting; the latter leaves no right at all.
But save in this respect their practical effect is the same, although their form
is different." Salmond, Jurisprudence (6th ed. 192o) 44o.
" Townsend v. Jemison, (1850, U. S.) 9 How. 407; McEhnoyle v. Cohen
(i839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 312; Don v. Lippmann (1837, H. L.) 5 Clark & Fin. i.
'As to the statute of limitations, see CoMIENTS (1919) 28 YAIE LAw JouRNAL,
492, 493; as to the statute of frauds, see supra p. 319.
"Leroy v. Crowninshield (1820, C. C.) 2 Mason, 151.
"Davis v. Mills (19o4) 194 U. S. 451, 24 Sup. Ct. 692.
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other respects. However that may be, it manifestly cannot determine
the policy of our law with respect to the statute of frauds. The prob-
lem of the statute of limitations in the Conflict of Laws is quite different
from that raised by the statute of frauds, so that the conclusions reached
as regards the former cannot reasonably afford a solution for the latter.
We must beware lest we determine legal questions, which should be
controlled by considerations of social utility and policy, by a purely
mechanical process.
The wide meaning given to the term "procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws has already done much mischief. Our courts would do well to
keep in mind the real meaning of the rule that all matters of procedure
are governed by the local law of the forum. The sole object of the
rule is to enable the courts to operate the judicial machinery in the
customary manner. There are vast differences in the technical rules
controlling the conduct of litigation under the systems of procedure
prevailing in the different countries and any attempt to try a "foreign"
cause of action in accordance with the rules of the state or country in
which it arose would be doomed to failure. A foreign litigant must
therefore of necessity conform to the procedure of the court in which he
seeks to enforce his claim. There is no reason, however, why a matter
affecting the merits of the case or the operative effect of facts when once
proved should not be controlled by the law governing the substantive
rights of the parties, provided it is of a nature to pass conveniently and
without ethical shock through the legal machinery of the forum.
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The label attaching to such matter from the standpoint of internal law
matters little. It may be clearly "substantive" or both "substantive" and
"procedural" or possibly even exclusively "procedural," as these terms
may have been defined in the past.
IV
In the light of the above we may concur in the view prevailing on the
continent and in Latin-America that the "modes of proof" should be
governed, at least in the matter of the statute of frauds, by the law
controlling the contract in other respects. More accurately speaking,
the statement should be that it is governed by the law determining the
formalities with which contracts must be executed. 75 Whether these
'Even the "burden of proof," as distinguished from the "burden of going
forward," may have to be controlled by the law governing the substantive rights
of the parties.
" "The laws concerning proof relate closely to those concerning the form
of acts, although they are not fully identical therewith. The rule locus regit
actun, which authorizes parties to an act to make use of the forms prescribed
by the law of the place where they are, signifies necessarily also that as regards
the proof of these respective rights they may invoke the same law of the lex
loci actus. If it were otherwise, the rule would mean nothing." Pillet, Principes
de Droit International Priv6 (9o3) 489.
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should be deemed controlled by the law of the place of contracting, or
by the law of the place of performance, or, if the contract relates to
land, by the law of the situs, cannot be gone into here. In another place
the writer has suggested that a rule in the alternative would best meet
the needs of interstate or international business.7 6  The same argu-
ments would be applicable to the statute of frauds. The fact that a
contract which does not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds
comes into existence and is only unenforceable raises the question, how-
ever, whether the lex fori should not be recognized as one of the alterna-
tives, so that such a contract will be enforced if it satisfies the law of
the forum. Lain6,77 a distinguished authority on the subject of the
Conflict of Laws in France, has suggested in general that if a transac-
tion satisfies the requirements of the forum as to form, effect should be
given to it, although it does not comply with the requirements of the
lex loci or the law governing the transaction in other respects. By rea-
son of the fact that the statute of frauds has been so often regarded as
procedural, it would seem that Professor Lain6's suggestion might
perhaps afford a happy solution for the problem before us.7 8  Policy
requires that international transactions be sustained as far as possible;
and as it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find a unitary rule
that will give desirable results in its application to the multitudinous
interstate or international transactions of ever varying character, there
would appear to be no way of attaining the desired end except by a
recognition of rules in the alternative. Ordinarily such alternatives will
have reference to the laws of states or countries with which the transac-
tion has a close connection at the time of its execution. When, how-
ever, the mutual agreement of the parties is conceded, and the required
mode of expressing that agreement is alone in issue, as in the case of the
statute of frauds, it might not be improper to enforce such foreign
contract if it meets the requirements of the lex fori, though it is unen-
forceable under the lex loci or the law governing the transaction in other
respects.7 9  Such a solution of the problem would reconcile also the
decisions of the continental courts. The statute of frauds is said to
" Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as regards Form in the Conflict of
Laws (1911) 20 YALE Lk~v JouRNAL, 427, 455-462; Validity and Effects of
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 ibid. 655, 672-673.
" Lain5 (19o8) 35 Chnet, 681-685.
'A rule in the alternative has been advocated by eminent foreign jurists.
Pillet, Principes de Droit International Privi (19o3) 490; Surville & Arthuys,
Cours Elimentaire de Droit International Priv6 (6th ed. 1915) 604; Synnest-
vedt, Le Droit Privg de la Scandinavie (19o4) 291; Verdia, Tratado elemental
de derecho internacional privado (9o8) 302; 5 Weiss, TraitM de Droit Inter-
national Privi (2d ed. 1913) 512.
'An alternative rule in the above sense would do away of course with such
difficulties as were raised by the Cuban requirement of "protocolization" in the
case of Reilly v. Steinhart (1916) 217 N. Y. 549, 112 N. E. 468.
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concern the substance of the contract in France and Italy,80 while it is
regarded as affecting procedure in Germany and Austria.81 If we look
beyond the formal expression of the rule we find the following:
Austria and Germany have no statute of frauds. When a contract
made in France, which would be perfectly valid by French law were it
not made unenforceable there by Art. 1341 of the Civil Code, is pre-
sented before a German or an Austrian court, it appears to be felt that
policy requires the enforcement of such contract. The easiest way of
reaching this result under the circumstances seemed to be to regard the
foreign statute of frauds as a rule of evidence and therefore as pro-
cedural. If it were recognized that such a contract is enforceable if it
satisfies either the law of the place of execution or the law of the forum
there would be no need of stretching the term "procedure" in order to
attain a result which appears desirable from an international point of
view.
There are those, however, who assume a position which is the exact
opposite to the one just stated. Instead of endeavoring as far as possi-
ble to enforce contracts not complying with the statute of frauds, they
contend that the statute is expressive of a policy of such a fundamental
character that no action will lie on a foreign contract, valid and enforce-
able under the foreign law, if the statute of the forum is not satisfied.
This public policy argument has been advanced by Wharton, who
says :812
"Statutes directing that no suit shall be sustained, in certain classes of
cases, except on written testimony, are based on moral grounds. Their
object, as is shown by the title of that which served as the pattern of all
others, is to prevent fraud and perjury. Here, then, comes into play
the position on which Savigny lays such great stress-that moral laws,
or laws to effect moral ends, which are imposed by particular states, are
peremptory and coercive, and are to be taken as rules of procedure by
the judges of such states."
Similar language is used by a number of courts.83 In nearly all of
them, following Wharton's example, the policy and procedure argu-
ments are used interchangeably. Such a mode of reasoning leads,
however, to confusion. The two arguments are in their nature quite
distinct. If the statute of frauds affects "procedure" from the stand-
point of the Conflict of Laws, the necessary consequence is that all f or-
eign contracts will be tested by the requirements of the statute of
frauds of the forum. If the contract satisfies the statute of the forum
it will be enforced, although it is unenforceable under the law of the
place of contracting. If it does not meet the requirements of the statute
of frauds of the forum, it will not be enforced, although it is valid and
''Supra p. 319.
'Supra p. 319.
822 Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 195o) sec. 69o.
83Heaton v. Eldridge, supra note 25; Barbour v. Campbell, supra note 26.
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enforceable under the lex loci. The public policy argument, as it is
understood in the Conflict of Laws, comes into operation only when it
is conceded that on principle the foreign law is applicable, and effect is
denied to the foreign law only by way of exception, because of para-
mount considerations of policy arising in the particular case. The
policy argument has, therefore, no meaning, so far as it relates to
the statute of frauds, unless the statute is regarded as affecting the
substantive rights of the parties. Where the contract does not satisfy
the law of the forum it will not be enforced, if the policy argument is
accepted, although it is valid and enforceable under the lex loci. In this
case the result reached is the same as would be the case if the statute
of frauds had been regarded by the law of the forum as procedural.
The result is not identical, however, if the statute of the forum is satis-
fied, but the law of the place of contracting is not, so that the contract
is unenforceable under the lex loci. As the substantive rights of the
parties are controlled by the lex loci the contract would be unenforce-
able everywhere, whereas it would be enforced if the statute of frauds
of the forum were deemed to be procedural.
If the suit is brought in a jurisdiction taking the correct view-that the
statute affects the "substance" of the contract-no action will lie upon
the foreign contract if it is unenforceable under the foreign law.
4
On the other hand, if the contract is enforceable under the foreign law,
it should be enforced on principle. But if the statute of frauds of the
forum is deemed to rest on paramount moral considerations, as
Wharton contends, it would override the foreign law, in the interest of
local morality, and allow no action on the contract. The question is,
therefore, whether Wharton's contention is sound. It is submitted that
it is not. So far as authority is concerned, there are cases which are
inconsistent with the idea that the statute of frauds, while substantive,
lays down at the same time a rule of public policy. In these cases effect
was given to the foreign contract notwithstanding the fact that such
a contract would have been void if it had been made in the jurisdiction
of the forum.8 5 This could not have been done if the statute of the
forum were expressive of a stringent public policy.8" There is but one
case which lends support to the public policy argument-that of Bar-
8Where the foreign statute is not an ordinary statute of frauds, but contains
a provision that no suit can be brought in the absence of "protocolization," which
may, however, be compelled by an action at law, the requirement may be di-
regarded by the courts of other states as a "procedural" one. Reilly v. Steinhart
(I916) 217 N. Y. 549, 112 N. E. 468.
's Wolf v. Burke, supra note 25; Houghtaling v. Ball, supra note 20; Halloran
v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. supra note 22.
' Nor is the contract illegal or opposed to public policy from a purely internal
viewpoint, so that if executed on both sides neither party could recover what
he has given. Craig v. Vanpelt (1821, Ky.) 3 J. 3. Marsh, 489; Bates v. Babcock
(1892) 95 Calif. 479, 30 Pac. 605; Hansen v. Uniform Seamless Wire Co. (1917,
C. C. A. ist) 243 Fed. 177.
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bour v. Campbell.87 In that case suit was brought in Kansas upon an
Idaho contract to pay the debt of another, which was assumed to be
valid and enforceable under the Idaho law, the law of the latter state not
having been proved. The Supreme Court of the state of Kansas
declined to enforce the contract because it did not meet the requirements
of the Kansas statute of frauds. The court put its decision on the
ground of public policy, but relied exclusively upon Wharton, who
appears to use the public policy and procedure arguments interchange-
ably. It is not certain, therefore, whether the court was aware of the
distinction between these arguments, as shown above, and whether it
meant in fact to subscribe to the doctrine that the statute of frauds is
substantive. 8
Still less conclusive is the case of Emery v. Burbank,"9 in which suit
was brought in Massachusetts against a resident of that state upon an
oral agreement to make a will which he had entered into in the state of
Maine. Under the Massachusetts statute an agreement to make a will
was not valid unless in writing. Although it was assumed in this case
also that the contract was good in Maine, it was held to be unenforceable
nevertheless in view of the Massachusetts statute. One of the grounds
relied upon was the public policy argument. In this connection
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said :9o
"But the statute evidently embodies a fundamental policy. The
ground, of course, is the prevention of fraud and perjury, which are
deemed likely to be practiced without this safeguard. The nature of
the contract is such that it naturally would be performed or sued upon
at the domicil of the promisor. If the policy of Massachusetts makes
void an oral contract of this sort made within the State, the same policy
forbids that Mdssachusetts testators should be sued here upon such
contracts without written evidence, wherever they are made."
The court expressly declined to express an opinion on the point
whether the policy would apply also to agreements made, by non-
residents abroad.
This case lends no support to the proposition that the fourth and
seventeenth sections of the English statute of frauds establish a funda-
mental policy in the face of which no foreign contract can be enforced.
Emery v. Burbank differs from the cases falling within the sections
just referred to in two respects. In the first place, the Massachusetts
statute rendered the contract itself void, if it did not satisfy the require-
ments of the statute. The consequence attaching to non-compliance
was therefore more severe than would follow from non-compliance
' Supra note 26.
' This is especially true in view of that fact that the Kansas statute uses the
phrase "no action shall be brought" (Gen. Sts. 1915, sec. 4889) which is commonly
regarded as laying down a rule of procedure.
"Supra note 26.
Ibid. 163 Mass. at p. 328, 39 N. E. at p. io'27.
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where the case falls within the fourth and seventeenth sections of the
English statute of frauds. Of more importance, however, is the fact
that the agreement in question related to the making of a will. The
party sued was a resident of Massachusetts and the court felt that it
was the intention of the legislator to protect residents of Massachusetts
against agreements of that character unless they were in writing. Such
protective policy was deemed to extend also to contracts made by resi-
dents of Massachusetts in other states. These special circumstances
clearly distinguish the case from those falling within the ordinary
statute of frauds.
On principle it is obvious that the doctrine of public policy should not
be invoked in the Conflict of Laws, except in a clear case. Is the statute
of frauds based upon such moral grounds, as Wharton alleges, that
it must control in the interest of the local security all cases brought
before its courts? The civilized countries are divided as to the wisdom
of requiring written evidence of contracts falling within the fourth and
seventeenth sections of the statute of frauds. Some legislators appear
to feel that the local conditions are such that the requirement of written
evidence is desirable. Others, taking account of the conditions existing
in their own countries, appear to conclude that such a requirement
would encourage fraud rather than prevent it. Even in England and
the United States the opinions of the courts and writers are greatly
divided as to the desirability of a statute of frauds.91 Under these
circumstances it would seem that a contract which has been entered
into in a foreign state or country where written evidence is not required
should be enforced elsewhere. Moral considerations of a paramount
character, sufficient to warrant a disregard of private rights, not being
involved,9 2 the application of the local statute should be restricted to
contracts made within the state.9 3
What has been said above applies not only to the necessity of a
memorandum in writing, but also to it sufficiency.
"It is only in respect of very special kinds of contracts that written evidence
can wisely be demanded by the law. In the case of all ordinary mercantile
agreements such a requirement does more harm than good; and the law would
do well in accepting the principle that a man's word is as good as his bond. The
Statute of Frauds, by which most of these rules of exclusive evidence have
been established, is an instrument for the encouragement of frauds rather than
for the suppression of them." Salmond, Jurisprudence (6th ed. 1920) 447.
' See also Despagnet & de Boeck, P'rcs de Droit International Privj (5th ed.
I9o9) 534; 8 Laurent, Droit Civil International (188i) 5I; Weiss, Mamnel de
Droit International Privj (6th ed. igog) 656; 5 Weiss, Traiti de Droit Interna-
tional Privg (2d ed. 1913) 519-520.
If the principle were adopted in the Conflict of Laws as regards the statute
of frauds that a contract is enforceable if it satisfies either the law of the place
of contracting, or the law of the place of performance, the local statute of frauds
of the state in which suit is brought would be applicable only if the contract
were both made and to be performed within such state.
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The conclusions of this study may be summed up as follows:
(i) The fourth and seventeenth sections of the statute of frauds
affect the substantive rights of the parties and not merely procedure,
and matters falling within their provisions are controlled by the law
governing the formalities of contracts in general.
(2) The statute of frauds is not expressive of a public policy from
the standpoint of the Conflict of Laws, so as to preclude the enforcement
of a foreign contract. A contract satisfying the requirements of the
proper foreign law will therefore be enforced, although it does not
meet the requirements of the statute of frauds of the forum.
(3) The peculiar nature of the statute of frauds makes it desirable,
at least as a matter of legislative policy, that contracts not enforce-
able under the statute of frauds of the state whose law determines the
formalities of contracts in general shall be enforced nevertheless if
they meet the requirements of the statute of the forum.
